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Abstract
Why an institution’s rules and regulations are obeyed or disobeyed is an important
question for regulatory agencies. This paper discusses the findings of an empirical study
that shows that the use of threat and legal coercion as a regulatory tool—in addition to
being more expensive to implement—can sometimes be ineffective in gaining
compliance. Using survey data collected from 2292 taxpayers accused of tax avoidance,
it will be demonstrated that variables such as trust need to be considered when managing
non-compliance. If regulators are seen to be acting fairly, people will trust the motives of
that authority, and will defer to their decisions voluntarily. This paper therefore argues
that to shape desired behavior, regulators will need to move beyond motivation linked
purely to deterrence. Strategies directed at reducing levels of distrust between the two
sides may prove particularly effective in gaining voluntary compliance with an
organization’s rules and regulations.
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Who me? I didn't do anything wrong: Trust, resistance and compliance among tax
scheme investors
Introduction
For many regulatory agencies, managing non-compliance has become
increasingly difficult over the past few decades. With the advent of globalisation and the
disturbing increase in individuals and corporate citizens exploiting loopholes in the law
(McBarnet, 2003), the question of how regulators can best ensure voluntary compliance
with the spirit of the law is important. Having an accurate understanding of why people
are motivated to accept third party decisions and rules can go someway to answering this
question.
Two quite different theories that attempt to explain compliance behavior have
been proposed. The rational choice model has previously dominated the formulation of
public policy in areas as diverse as criminal justice, welfare policy, and tax. The model
posits that people are motivated entirely by economic welfare. They assess opportunities
and risks and disobey the law when the anticipated fine and probability of being caught
are small in relation to the gains from non-compliance (for a discussion see Kagan &
Scholz, 1984). In the taxation context, for example, a taxpayers’ choice is between
compliance and tax evasion. By complying, the taxpayer incurs a loss in the form of taxes
paid, but by evading tax there is the chance of a relative gain if the evasion is undetected.
Alternatively, there is the chance of an even greater loss if the evasion is detected and
penalized. According to the rational choice model, taxpayers calculate these risks when
deciding whether or not to comply. Advocates of the rational choice model therefore
believe that individuals or firms will comply with an authority’s rules and decisions only
when confronted with harsh sanctions and penalties.
In recent times there has been a convergence toward questioning the adequacy of
the rational choice model for understanding interaction in natural settings and as a basis
for social policy (e.g., Cook & Levi, 1990; Tyler, 1990). Contemporary regulatory
scholars suggest that attitudes and moral obligations, in addition to purely economic
calculations or fear of punishment, are important in explaining compliance behavior and
therefore need to be considered when managing non-compliance (e.g., Braithwaite, J.,
2002; Kagan & Scholz, 1984). According to advocates of this view, the rational choice
model ignores the possibility that people may be just as concerned about social issues
such as justice and fairness when deciding whether or not to comply (Kinsey, Grasmick
& Smith, 1991; Murphy, in press; Wenzel, 2002), or that they may be concerned about
damaging their social reputation if caught doing the wrong thing (Grasmick & Bursik,
1990). It is hypothesized, therefore, that the most productive way to achieve genuine
acceptance of, and adherence to, regulations is not by an exclusive reliance upon
sanctions and legal coercion but rather through strategies that appeal to a citizen’s law
abiding self (e.g., Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992; Bardach & Kagan, 1982; Braithwaite &
Makkai, 1994; Hawkins, 1990). Placing trust in the foreground of a regulatory encounter
has been one such strategy that has been suggested in the literature (e.g., Braithwaite &
Makkai, 1994; Cherney, 1997).
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Trust and Compliance
Over the past decade, the specific importance of trust in organizational relations
has been increasingly recognized (e.g., Braithwaite & Levi, 1998; Kramer & Tyler, 1996;
Putnam, 1993). So too has the role that trust plays in influencing compliance with an
organization’s decisions and regulations (e.g., Braithwaite & Makkai, 1994; Shapiro,
1987, 1990). In fact, Braithwaite and Makkai (1994) go so far as to suggest that trust
actually nurtures compliance. Support for their view comes from a handful of empirical
studies that have explored the relationship between trust and compliance (e.g.,
Braithwaite & Makkai, 1994; Kim & Mauborgne, 1993; Scholz & Lubell, 1998; Tyler,
1990; 1998; Tyler & Degoey, 1995; 1996). These studies show specifically that trust does
play an important role in determining acceptance and compliance with an organization’s
rules and decisions.
For example, in a study of multinational corporations, Kim and Mauborgne
(1993) were interested in determining what motivated top level executives of subsidiaries
to comply with corporate strategic decisions. Using a longitudinal survey methodology,
Kim and Mauborgne found that if the executives trusted head office management, there
was an overall positive effect on their compliance with corporate strategic decisions.
Tyler and Degoey (1996) were also interested in exploring whether trust influenced
voluntary acceptance of decisions. They interviewed citizens of San Francisco about their
views of a regulatory agency charged with enacting water conservation policies during a
water shortage. They found that the regulator’s trustworthiness was the major factor
shaping citizens’ willingness to accept their decisions. Tyler and Degoey also showed
that within a variety of contexts and groups, trust consistently influenced feelings of
obligation to obey organizational rules and decisions. In another study, Scholz and Lubell
(1998) tested the link between trust and tax compliance. Using data collected from a
national survey of 299 taxpayers in America, Scholz and Lubell showed that taxpayers’
trust in government and trust in other citizens significantly influenced their levels of tax
compliance, with decreases in trust resulting in higher levels of self-reported non-
compliance with tax obligations.
Perception that a regulatory agency is untrustworthy has also been shown to be a
function of whether regulators distrust those from whom they are demanding cooperation
and compliance. Braithwaite and Makkai (1994) argue that if those being regulated are
treated as trustworthy, they will repay this respect with voluntary compliance (see also
Feld & Frey, 2002; Fisse & Braithwaite, 1993; Frey, 1997). Braithwaite and Makkai
(1994) attempted to examine this question empirically by studying compliance in the
Australian nursing home industry. Over a 20-month period, 410 nursing homes were
inspected with the aim of determining whether or not they complied with 31 nursing
home standards. During an initial inspection, each nursing home was given a compliance
rating against each of these 31 standards. Eighteen months later, a follow up inspection
was conducted and the compliance score given at the second inspection was of interest.
Braithwaite and Makkai found that if inspectors were initially seen to be treating nursing
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home managers with trust, compliance was more likely to improve in the two years
following the initial inspection.
Previous research therefore suggests that trust does play an important role in
nurturing compliance with an authority’s rules and decisions. Not only does this appear to
be the case among individuals, but it also appears to be the case in the corporate sector. A
regulatory strategy that initially places trust in the foreground of any encounter may
therefore prove to be particularly effective in gaining individual and corporate
compliance. Before advocating such a view, however, one must first be able to
understand and explain the drivers of trust. For example, what can a regulatory authority
do to improve trust among those being regulated? And what type of factors can lead to a
decrease in trust?
Procedural Justice
Several researchers (e.g., Folger & Konovsky, 1989; Levi, 1998; Tyler, 1997;
Tyler & Degoey, 1996) argue that the key to creating trust is to act in ways that citizens
will experience to be fair. This argument is the core conclusion of the literature on
procedural justice. Procedural justice concerns the perceived fairness of the procedures
involved in decision-making and the perceived treatment one receives from the decision
maker. The procedural justice literature demonstrates that people’s reactions to their
personal experiences with authorities are rooted in their evaluations of the fairness of
procedures those agencies use to exercise their authority (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler,
2000, 2001; Tyler & Blader, 2000). In fact, there is evidence to show that people who
feel they have been treated fairly by an organization will be more likely to trust that
organization and be more inclined to accept its decisions and follow its directions (Lind
& Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Degoey, 1996). It has also been found that people are most likely
to challenge a situation collectively when they believe that the procedures are unfair
(Tyler & Smith, 1998). According to Tyler, this does not mean that the favorability of
decision outcomes is irrelevant. Tyler argues that outcomes do influence reactions to
experiences with third parties, and they strongly influence satisfaction with outcomes.
However, both the willingness to accept outcomes and feelings about the decision-maker
are dominated by reactions to the process (e.g., Casper, Tyler & Fisher, 1988; Lind,
Kulik, Ambrose & de Vera Park, 1993).
The ‘group value approach’ in the procedural justice literature specifically
highlights the importance of an authority’s perceived fairness, interpersonal respect, and
neutrality in its dealings with others (Tyler, 1989; 1994; 1997; Tyler & Smith, 1998; see
also Murphy, in press). If people believe that an authority is ‘trying’ to be fair and treats
its citizens fairly, they trust the motives of that authority and develop a long-term
commitment to accepting its decisions. Being treated politely, with dignity and respect,
and having genuine respect shown for one’s rights and social status, have also been
shown to enhance feelings of fairness. Finally, people are influenced by judgments of the
neutrality of decision-making procedures. Neutrality includes assessments of honesty,
impartiality, and the use of fact, not personal opinions, in decision-making. People
generally seek a level playing field in which no one is unfairly advantaged (Tyler &
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Degoey, 1996; Tyler & Lind, 1992). Hence, if individuals perceive an authority to be
acting fairly and neutrally, and they feel treated with respect and dignity, they will be
more willing to trust that authority and will voluntarily obey and defer to its decisions
and rules.
The Present Study
The aim of the present study is to explore empirically whether trust plays a role in
predicting compliance in the taxation context. Scholz and Lubell (1998) have already
addressed this question and shown that trust does play a role in predicting tax
compliance. It should be noted, however, that Scholz and Lubell tested an instrumental-
based version of trust. Instrumental-based trust sees trust being linked to individual
beliefs about the likelihood of receiving positive outcomes from interactions with
authorities. In the taxation context, for example, instrumental-based trust is linked to
judgements of financial risk. Here, citizens undertake some immediate costly effort like
paying taxes, but face some risk that future collective benefits expected in return for
compliance (e.g., tax-supported public goods) may not materialize unless the government
and other citizens maintain their side of the bargain. Scholz and Lubell therefore argue
that the positive experience of receiving tax funded benefits goes on to enhance trust and
hence the likelihood of complying with tax obligations, while the negative experience of
not receiving those benefits reduces both trust and compliance.
While Scholz and Lubell (1998) found that instrumental-based trust played an
important role in predicting tax compliance, the present study aims to extend their work
by showing that social-based trust—trust which is based on social relationships and fair
treatment—is just as important, if not more important, for determining a taxpayers’
willingness to comply with a tax authority’s rules and decisions. The present study tested
this assumption by conducting a large-scale survey on a group of Australian taxpayers
engaged in a long-standing dispute with the Australian Taxation Office (ATO).
Disputes between regulatory authorities and those being regulated offer unique
opportunities for examining people’s willingness to accept decisions and rules. Disputes
between taxpayers and tax authorities are particularly interesting because of the widely
held belief that economic self-interest factors dominate taxpayers’ actions. Consider for
example the situation where a taxpayer is accused of tax avoidance. The accompanying
penalties and interest on their outstanding tax debts can be quite substantial. Given the
presence of economic self-interest factors, advocates of the rational choice model would
predict that a taxpayer would respond to this situation based on how much they stood to
lose financially. Those who argue that attitudes play a role in compliance behavior, in
contrast, would predict that social factors—as well as financial factors—would affect
how this taxpayer would respond to the tax authority’s accusation. By examining in detail
the situation surrounding a real life dispute that involves high financial stakes, the present
study will be able to evaluate the validity of these two opposing theories. The examined
dispute is also of theoretical interest in its own right because it has implications for how
regulators in general should manage non-compliance.
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The Dispute
Throughout the 1990s tens of thousands of Australian taxpayers ‘invested’ in
mass-marketed tax effective schemes (for an example of a scheme see Appendix A).
Their investments provided them with combined tax deductions exceeding four billion
Australian dollars (approximately $2.6 billion USD). The ATO maintained that
investments in these arrangements were largely funded through tax deductions and little
private capital was at risk. The ATO therefore came to the conclusion in 1998 that
taxpayers who invested in these schemes did so for the ‘dominant purpose’ of obtaining a
tax benefit, and, as a result, the anti-avoidance provisions of Part IVA of the Australian
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 applied1. The ATO moved to disallow scheme related
tax deductions claimed up to six years earlier and issued amended assessments to
approximately 42,000 investors2. Scheme investors were told that they had to
immediately pay back taxes with interest and appropriate penalties or they would run the
risk of facing the full extent of the law.
Investor reactions toward the ATO’s decision to disallow previous years’ scheme-
related tax deductions came as somewhat of a surprise to the ATO. The majority of
investors claimed that the schemes they invested in had been sold to them, in many cases
by their accountants, as a way of legally minimizing tax. Many investors therefore
believed that they had done nothing wrong by investing in these schemes and actively
resisted the ATO’s demands that they pay back tax. In fact, at the time of starting
fieldwork for this study in January 2002—three and a half years after amended
assessments had been issued—more than 50% of scheme investors had still refused to
enter into settlement arrangements with the ATO to pay back their taxes (a 50% non-
compliance rate is considered extremely high; ATO, personal communication). Of
interest to the present study was why such a large number of investors chose to resist the
ATO’s subsequent decision to recover tax owing on disallowed scheme deductions. Was
the resistance a result of decreased trust in the ATO (and if so, what led to this decrease
in trust), or was it simply a result of economic rationalism? The answer to these questions
will be addressed using survey data collected from 2292 scheme investors.
Method
Participants
The data used to test the predictions in this article came from The Australian Tax
System Survey of Tax Scheme Investors (Murphy, 2002). The survey was posted to a
random sample of 6000 Australian tax scheme investors who had been selected from
ATO case files. After repeated appeals for participation, 2292 useable surveys were
received. When adjusted for out-of-scope taxpayers who had died, moved address, or
who were incapable of completing a survey (N=677), a response rate of 43% was
obtained. While somewhat low, this response rate compares very well with experiences
from other tax surveys conducted in Australia (Mearns & Braithwaite, 2001;
Wallschutzky, 1984; 1996). Using the limited amount of demographic data available on
the ATO’s case files, it was found that the sample of scheme investors who completed the
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survey was representative of the overall scheme investor population (for detailed
information on the survey’s methodology see Murphy & Byng, 2002a).
The respondents in the final sample were between 24 and 81 years of age (M =
46.50, SD = 9.30), 82% were male and 17% were female (1% did not disclose their
gender). Their average personal income level for the previous financial year was
approximately $73,000 (currently about $44,000 USD) and their average family income
was approximately $93,000 (currently about $56,000 USD).
Procedure
Survey data were collected over a seven-month period between January and July
2002. The initial survey package was posted to each taxpayer in the sample and included
a cover letter, the questionnaire, and a reply-paid envelope. The covering letter explained
the intent of the study, specifically that the researchers were interested in hearing from
taxpayers whose tax assessments had been amended by the ATO. The letter also
guaranteed participants strict confidentiality and referred potential respondents to a toll-
free number should they have any questions.
The survey process was modeled on the Dillman Total Design Method (Dillman,
1978), which involves following up non-respondents over a period of time. The follow-
up of non-respondents after the first mailing was accomplished using an identification
number attached to each questionnaire, which was in turn linked to the sample name at
the ATO. In order to protect investors’ privacy, the ATO was responsible for all mailings
of the survey and reminder letters. Investors who agreed to participate were asked to
return their completed questionnaires in a reply-paid envelope to the Australian National
University (ANU) for analysis. This procedure ensured that researchers at the ANU did
not have access to the names or addresses of sampled investors. It also ensured that the
ATO did not have access to any individual taxpayers’ survey responses. A total of six
mailings were made and by the end of July 2002, a total of 2292 useable surveys had
been received.
Questionnaire
The survey consisted of a range of questions designed to measure respondents’
views of the ATO and the Australian tax system. Also measured were the possible
reasons why taxpayers invested in tax minimization schemes and why there was such
widespread taxpayer resistance to the ATO’s debt recovery procedures. The present
article, however, only deals with those survey questions relevant to five categories of
variables: procedural justice, trust, resistance, outcome favorability, and demographic
control variables (for those interested in other findings from the survey see Murphy &
Byng, 2002b).
Procedural justice. The procedural justice variables used in the present study were
taken from previous research on the group value model (e.g., Tyler, 1997), with its
distinction between the sub-concepts respect, fairness, and neutrality. Two additional
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scales adapted from Braithwaite and Makkai (1994) were also used to measure sub-
concepts of procedural justice: trustworthy treatment and consultation. Exact wording
and formats of the items used to construct these scales are given in Appendix B.
Trust. Braithwaite’s (1997) measure of institutional trust, modified for use in the
taxation context, was used to measure taxpayers’ level of trust in the ATO. Again,
Appendix B details all items used in the scales. An additional survey question assessed
whether or not taxpayers’ trust had been detrimentally affected by their recent experience
with the ATO.
Resistance. To measure taxpayer’s level of resistance toward the ATO,
respondents were presented with six statements asking them to rate how they viewed the
ATO (Braithwaite, 1995). According to Braithwaite (2003), resistance reflects doubts
about the intentions of the ATO to behave cooperatively and benignly towards those it
dominates and provides a rhetoric for calling on taxpayers to be watchful, to fight for
their rights, and to curb tax office power.
Outcome favorability. The outcome favorability scale used here was adapted from
Tyler’s (1997) instrumental judgement index. It should be noted that this measure refers
to the perceived outcome favorability to oneself of the tax authority’s decision processes
rather than to the tax system in general; thus its inclusion in an analysis is designed to
measure self-interest concerns3.
Demographic variables. Survey respondents were asked to indicate their age, sex
(1 = male, 2 = female), personal income, and family income (each on a scale from 0 to
250+ thousand dollars).
Questionnaire Pre-testing
It should be noted at this stage that prior to sending the Investors’ Survey into the
field, the questionnaire was not pre-tested in its entirety. There were three reasons for this
decision. First, a large scale tax survey of the general population—which shared many
questions in common with the Investors’ Survey—had been conducted by researchers at
the ANU just one year earlier. The response rate and reliability of scales used in that
general population survey were found to be very good. Second, as indicated in the
Procedure section above, privacy issues precluded ANU researchers from having access
to the names and addresses of scheme investors (an ATO officer would have had to be
assigned to help with the pre-testing—something which the ATO was reluctant to devote
further resources to). Third, the mass-marketed tax scheme issue had received a lot of
media attention. It was of concern that pre-testing the survey would have called attention
to the aims of the research, thus possibly biasing responses in the survey proper. It was
for these three reasons, therefore, that pre-testing of the survey in its entirety was not
undertaken.
Trust and compliance
10
Results
Factor Analysis
A factor analysis was first conducted to test for the assumed conceptual
differentiation between all four non-demographic categories of variables used in the
present study (i.e., procedural justice, trust, resistance, and outcome favorability). The
analysis yielded a four-factor solution explaining 52% of the variance (see Table 1).
With this sample, it was found that 26 of the 28 items loaded clearly, and as
anticipated, on their respective factors (three of these items, however, did not reach the
desired cut-off level of 0.44). Only one item appeared to have substantial loadings on two
factors. When considering its content the item conceptually seemed to fit Factor 1 better.
The remaining two items that did not load onto their expected factor were deleted from
any further analyses. Thus, Factor 1 comprised 11 items that measured facets of
procedural justice, Factor 2 comprised seven items that measured trust, Factor 3
comprised six items that measured taxpayer resistance, and Factor 4 comprised two items
that measured outcome favourability.
---------------------------
insert Table 1 about here
---------------------------
Trust in the ATO
Scheme investors’ level of trust in the ATO was then analysed. Using
Braithwaite’s (1997) measure of institutional trust, it was found that scheme investors’
level of trust had a mean slightly below the midpoint (M = 2.40, SD = 0.74) on the five
point rating scale. This result indicates that scheme investors tended to be somewhat
distrusting of the ATO.
In order to ascertain whether their trust in the ATO was unusually low, investors’
level of trust was compared to taxpayers in the general population4. It was found that
scheme investors’ trust in the ATO (M = 2.40, SD = 0.74) was substantially lower than
the trust exhibited by taxpayers from the general population (M = 3.03, SD = 0.74). The
difference between the two groups was found to be statistically significant, F(1, 4266) =
1248.07, MSE = 0.33, p<0.001 (ω2 = 0.23). When further questioned about their trust in
the ATO, 89% of the scheme investors indicated that their trust had been adversely
affected because of the ATO’s actions to amend their tax returns.
Predicting Investor Resistance
Was the resistance exhibited by the majority of tax scheme participants towards
the ATO a result of their decreased trust in the ATO, or was it simply a result of
economic self-interest? In order to answer this question, a hierarchical regression analysis
was performed using ‘outcome favorability’ and ‘trust’ as predictors of ‘resistance’.
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In order to control for demographic differences between respondents, the
background variables ‘sex’, ‘age’, ‘personal income’ and ‘family income’ were used as
predictors of ‘resistance’ in the first step of the hierarchical regression analysis. As can be
seen in Table 2, the regression analysis failed to explain a significant portion of the
variance in Step 1, indicating that the demographic variables did not have any effect on
taxpayer resistance.
In order to identify the unique contribution offered by the two predictor variables
of interest, ‘outcome favorability’ was entered separately into the regression model at
Step 2, followed by ‘trust’ in Step 3. Table 2 presents the results for this analysis. First, it
should be noted that 36% of the variation in taxpayers’ resistance could be explained by
all of the variables in the model.
---------------------------
insert Table 2 about here
---------------------------
From Table 2 it can be seen that when the self-interest variable ‘outcome
favorabilty’ was entered into the model at Step 2, the measure was found to uniquely
explain 12% of the variation in taxpayers’ resistance. In fact, this variable was
significantly negatively related to taxpayer resistance (β = -0.14, p<0.001), indicating that
those who were more likely to think that ATO decisions were favorable to them tended to
be less resistant towards the ATO. In contrast to Step 1, the demographic variable ‘age’
now had a significant positive effect on taxpayer resistance (β = 0.06, p<0.01). While it is
unclear why age only had an effect on taxpayer resistance after outcome favorability was
entered into the model at Step 2, the finding indicates that older investors were more
likely to be resistant towards the ATO. No other variables predicted taxpayer resistance at
Step 2.
‘Trust’ was entered into the regression model at Step 3. It had a significant
negative effect on taxpayer resistance (β = -0.53, p<0.001) and uniquely explained 23%
of the variation in taxpayers’ resistance. This finding suggests that those who have lower
levels of trust in the ATO are more likely to be resistant towards the ATO.
When considered together, the findings suggest that ‘age’, ‘outcome favorabilty’
and ‘trust’ predict taxpayer ‘resistance’. However, before drawing any conclusions, it
should first be noted that ‘trust’ was found to have a greater effect on taxpayer
‘resistance’ than ‘outcome favorability’ (or ‘age’). Inspection of R2 change values at both
Steps 2 and 3 (0.12 versus 0.23, respectively) indicate that the entry of ‘trust’ as a
predictor at Step 3 affected the model much more than did the entry of ‘outcome
favorability’ at Step 2. While the findings do not deny self-interested action, they do
indicate that the resistance exhibited by the majority of tax scheme participants towards
the ATO was more likely to be a result of their decreased trust in the ATO.
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An additional hierarchical regression analysis was run using investors’ actual debt
level (in dollars)—rather than ‘outcome favorability’—as a more objective measure of
economic self-interest. When using this item it was found that investors’ ‘debt level’ and
‘trust’ still predicted taxpayers’ ‘resistance’, with ‘trust’ still explaining more of the
variance (‘age’ no longer had an effect). However, given that the measure of ‘outcome
favorability’ has been commonly used in the literature to measure instrumental judgments
(e.g., Tyler & Degoey, 1996), the conclusions made in this paper will be based on the
analyses presented in Table 2.
Predicting Institutional Trust
In the analysis performed earlier, it was found that scheme investors’ trust in the
ATO had been detrimentally affected as a result of their involvement in tax schemes. The
regression analysis presented in Table 2 also showed that taxpayers’ level of trust
significantly predicted taxpayer resistance. In particular, it was found that those taxpayers
who had lower levels of trust were more resistant towards the ATO. The specific reasons
why investors’ level of trust in the ATO was detrimentally affected by their involvement
in tax schemes was therefore of interest.
In order to test Tyler’s (1997) theory that perceptions of procedural unfairness
decrease trust, another hierarchical regression analysis was conducted. In Step 1 of the
regression analysis, the background variables ‘sex’, ‘age’, ‘personal income’ and ‘family
income’ were used to predict ‘trust’. As in the regression model above, these variables
were included to control for demographic differences between survey respondents.
In Step 2 of the regression analysis, the instrumental measure of ‘outcome
favorability’ was introduced as a predictor of ‘trust’. The five relational facets of
procedural justice were then introduced as a group of predictors in Step 3 of the
regression analysis. ‘Outcome favorability’ was entered into the model before the
procedural justice items because Tyler (1997) claims that perceptions of fair treatment
affect trust more so than favorable economic outcomes. If Tyler (1997) is correct in his
assumption, the R2 change value should be greater between Steps 2 and 3 of the model
than between Steps 1 and 2. The results from this regression analysis can be found in
Table 3.
As can be seen in Table 3, the regression analysis failed to explain a significant
portion of the variance in Step 1 (0%). This indicates that the demographic variables did
not have an effect on trust. In contrast, Steps 2 and 3 both explained significant portions
of the variance (17% and 42% respectively). Analysis of the regression results will
therefore mainly focus on the more complete third step.
-------------------------------------
insert Table 3 about here
-------------------------------------
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Upon further inspection of Table 3, it can be seen that 58% of the variation in
trust can be explained by the self-interest and procedural justice variables together,
suggesting that these variables had a substantial effect on the final model. All of the
procedural justice variables were found to have a positive effect on trust. For example,
the procedural justice variable ‘trustworthy treatment from the ATO’ had a positive effect
on trust (β = 0.08, p<0.001), indicating that respondents who believed the ATO treated
them as trustworthy were more likely to have higher levels of trust. Likewise, those who
were more likely to think the ‘ATO was fair’ (β = 0.36, p<0.001), those who believed the
ATO was ‘neutral’ in its decision-making procedures (β = 0.30, p<0.001), those who
were more likely to feel the ‘ATO respected them’ (β = 0.04, p<0.01), and those who felt
that the ‘ATO consults with the public’ about various tax issues (β = 0.10, p<0.001) were
also more likely to have higher levels of trust in the ATO.
When it came to the self-interest variable ‘outcome favorability’, it was found that
this item also had a significant positive effect on trust (β = 0.08, p<0.001). This indicates
that those who were more likely to think that ATO decisions were favorable to them were
also more likely to have higher levels of trust in the ATO. Like the first regression
analysis performed in this paper, this finding again suggests that self-interest does play a
significant role. However, as can be seen by the magnitude of the change in R2 between
Steps 1 and 2 and between Steps 2 and 3 (0.17 and 0.42, respectively), the self-interest
variable did not have the strongest effect on trust. In fact, in general, perceptions of fair
treatment appear to have affected investors’ trust more so than having received favorable
outcomes.
An additional hierarchical regression analysis was again conducted, replacing
‘outcome favorability’ with investors’ actual ‘debt level’. Unlike the analysis presented
above, this more objective measure of economic self-interest did not significantly predict
taxpayers’ trust in the ATO. All five procedural justice items still predicted taxpayers’
trust.
Structural Equation Model
One of the limitations of the regression analyses presented above is that they
cannot conclude convincingly that perceived poor treatment led to a decrease in trust and
that low trust was the causal factor that produced increased resistance. The most obvious
alternative model that could be used to explain the results is that those who resisted the
ATO’s attempts to recover tax later rationalized their non-compliance with reports of
decreased levels of trust brought on by poor treatment. Of course, a methodology that
would yield clearer evidence for the causal relationship between trust and resistance is
one based on a longitudinal design (i.e., either testing investors’ trust levels prior to their
dispute with the ATO, as well as after, or testing investors in a follow-up survey in which
measurement of the same concepts at two different points in time could be assessed). For
the purposes of the present study, however, these suggestions are unable to be tested.
Hence, in order to address the causal limitation in a more practical way, the
variables used in the regression analyses were subjected to a structural equation model
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using Analysis of Moment Structures (AMOS). Prior to arriving at the model presented in
Figure 1 a fully mediational model, with a non-recursive pathway between resistance and
trust, was tested. The non-recursive pathway between trust and resistance was used to test
whether trust was a mediator for taxpayer resistance (i.e., as hypothesized) or whether
taxpayer resistance was a mediator for trust (i.e., that decreased trust was used as a
rationalization for resisting authority)5. In constructing this non-recursive model,
however, the pathway from resistance to trust was not statistically significant, t = 1.07,
p>0.2, and therefore had to be removed. This particular finding suggests that in the
present context, resistance was not a mediator for trust. A number of other pathways were
also removed, leading to the final model presented in Figure 1.
---------------------
insert Figure 1 here
---------------------
In the final model, support was found for the idea that perceptions of procedural
justice increase trust (as indicated by the positive standardized path coefficients between
trust and consultation, trustworthy treatment, respect, fairness and neutrality) and
decrease levels of resistance (as indicated by the negative standardized path coefficients
between resistance and consultation, trustworthy treatment, and fairness). Like the
regression analyses presented earlier, outcome favorability was again found to have only
a minor part to play in predicting trust and resistance (as indicated by the small path
coefficients; 0.07 and –0.07, respectively). Finally, there was also a significant pathway
from trust to resistance (-0.30) suggesting that those who had less trust in the ATO were
also more likely to be resistant towards the ATO (as discussed in the previous paragraph,
the pathway from resistance to trust was not significant). Overall, these findings support
those of the regression analyses presented above; that poor treatment by a regulatory
authority can undermine trust in those being regulated, which in turn can lead to
increased resistance toward decisions and rules. The goodness-of-fit indices for the
structural equation model are presented in Table 4. According to the modification indices,
addition or deletion of any further pathways could not improve the model.
------------------------
insert Table 4 here
------------------------
Summary of Findings
The study reported in this paper examined why such a large number of tax scheme
investors chose not to comply with the ATO’s subsequent decision to recover tax owing
on disallowed scheme deductions. Specifically, the study was interested in exploring
whether trust played a role in this non-compliance. To summarize, it was found that
scheme investors’ level of trust in the ATO was substantially lower than that of the
general population. It was also found in a regression analysis that trust did play a role in
the resistance exhibited by tax scheme investors, and this factor outweighed the role
played by economic self-interest. Further, when examining why investors’ level of trust
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in the ATO was low, it was found in a second regression analysis that perceptions of
unfair treatment appeared to have affected investors’ trust more so than having received
an unfavorable outcome. Finally, using a structural equation model, in which the
relationship among all variables of interest could be examined, it was found that the
pathway from trust to resistance was significant, suggesting that taxpayer resistance could
be sufficiently predicted by decreased levels of trust. This particular finding is important
as it rejects the claim that taxpayers may be looking to rationalize their resistance by
using claims of decreased trust.
Discussion
While the law will always involve elements of coercion, the legal system has, at
best, a limited ability to compel people to obey the law. Knowing what motivates people
to obey and defer to decisions and rules is therefore important. As discussed in the
introduction to this paper, the ‘rational choice’ model of the individual has previously
dominated the formulation of public policy in many areas. This view suggests that people
are motivated to maximize their personal gains and minimize their personal losses. Those
advocating such a view therefore believe that non-compliance can only be dealt with by
handing out harsh sanctions and penalties.
The situation surrounding the mass-marketed tax scheme issue demonstrates,
however, that the use of threat and legal coercion as a regulatory enforcement tool—in
addition to being more expensive to implement—can sometimes be counter-productive
(see also Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992; Bardach & Kagan, 1982; Hawkins, 1990). For
example, the ATO’s initial use of threat and legal coercion with 42,000 tax scheme
investors did not appear to be as effective as desired in producing compliance. Instead of
complying, the majority of tax scheme investors actively resisted the ATO’s repeated
attempts to recover tax owing on their scheme related tax debts.
When attempting to explain why investors did not comply with the ATO’s
directives to pay back tax, the present study showed that taxpayer trust in the ATO played
a very important role in explaining their behavior. Specifically, the findings suggested
that trust, rather than economic self-interest, was the major predictor of investor
resistance towards the ATO, with those who were less trusting of the ATO being more
resistant. Further, perceptions of unfair treatment appeared to have affected investors’
trust more so than having received an unfavourable outcome. These findings are
interesting because they extend Scholz and Lubell’s (1998) work by showing that social-
based trust can also affect compliance in the taxation context. The results are also
important as they question the appropriateness of the ‘rational choice’ model as a basis
for effective regulation. Instead, the results argue that to effectively shape desired
behavior, regulators will need to move beyond an enforcement strategy linked purely to
deterrence.
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Moving Towards a More Effective Model of Regulation
Doubts about the effectiveness of a deterrence-based model of enforcement are
not new. In fact, for the past decade, many contemporary regulatory theorists have been
arguing that the most effective way in which to achieve genuine acceptance of
regulations is not by an exclusive reliance upon legal coercion but rather through the use
of strategies that attempt to bring the best out of those being regulated (e.g., Ayres &
Braithwaite, 1992; Braithwaite, 1993; Cherney, 1997; Sparrow, 2000). These theorists
argue that regulatory agencies risk discouraging civic virtue if they engage in aggressive
prosecution for relatively minor offenses, because those being regulated are likely to feel
that their past good faith efforts at compliance have not been acknowledged. Coupled
with the findings of the present study, it is therefore proposed that a regulatory strategy
that is directed at reducing levels of distrust between the two sides may prove particularly
effective in gaining voluntary compliance with an authority’s rules and decisions (see
also Braithwaite & Makkai, 1994; Cherney, 1997).
As can be seen from the results of the present study, the perceived trustworthy
treatment given by the ATO towards scheme investors was found to significantly predict
investors’ trust in the ATO. In other words, those investors who were less likely to feel
that the ATO treated them as trustworthy were also less likely to trust the ATO in return.
Findings such as these suggest that regulators may be able to use the responsive nature of
trust to encourage relevant individuals or industries to enter into cooperative
relationships, which in turn will ensure greater compliance with regulatory goals. Trust
appears to be a resource like no other, as it is not depleted through use but rather through
lack of use (Gambetta, 1988). Hence, the more that regulatory interactions are based on
trust the more likely regulators will be able to nurture the development of reciprocal trust
relationships.
The added advantage of adopting a regulatory strategy based on trust is that it
would involve an efficient use of resources. Treating others as trustworthy in the first
instance will elicit a more co-operative approach from the regulatee, more information is
likely to be forthcoming about their practices and possibly about areas of non-
compliance, and it will engage the regulatee in best practice decisions for securing
compliance (Black, 2001). If such a strategy works, both sides avoid expensive
enforcement and litigation procedures and more resources are left to expand regulatory
coverage. In such a situation, society will gain the benefits of greater compliance at a low
cost to the economy.
It would be naïve, however, to think that a strategy based purely on trust would be
effective in all cases (see Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992, pp19-53). A strategy based purely
on trust fails to recognize that there are some people who would take advantage of being
presumed to be trustworthy. A regulatory strategy that combines a preference for trust
with an ability to switch to a policy of distrust is therefore likely to be the most effective
(see also Braithwaite & Makkai, 1994). This dynamic strategy could enable regulators to
try trust first and escalate to more interventionist forms of regulation (e.g., more severe
sanctions) if abuse of trust occurs and persists. By having the threat of punishment in the
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background (see Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992), it reinforces to individuals that a
regulator’s attempts at cooperation should be listened to.
When escalating to more interventionist forms of regulation, however, it needs to
be kept in mind that people are also strongly concerned about issues of fair treatment,
neutrality, and respect when forming their opinions about the way a regulator handles
their situation. As the findings of the present study demonstrate, if sanctions or
punishments are perceived to be procedurally unjust, regulators also run the risk of
undermining trust. Thus, in order to create and maintain trust, regulators will need to
acknowledge the importance of procedural justice in their dealings with non-compliers,
and make a commitment to implement and nurture the principles of justice and fairness.
Regulators need to consider how they would want to be treated if their roles were
suddenly reversed.
Conclusion
While this paper has not been the first to critique a regulatory strategy based on
threat and legal coercion, it has been one of the first to provide convincing empirical
evidence to support a regulatory strategy based on trust. In particular, the findings from
the present study have shown that if taxpayers feel poorly treated by a tax authority as a
result of their infractions (innocent or otherwise), this can lead to a decrease in taxpayer
trust. This decrease in trust can then go on to affect their willingness to comply, and
might in fact lead to active resistance towards a regulatory authority. It has been proposed
here that by using a strategy based on trust, regulators may be more likely to prevent
widespread resistance towards their decisions, while at the same time nurturing the good
will of those with a commitment to compliance.
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Appendix A
To date, three categories of mass marketed schemes operating in the Australia
have been identified by the ATO (Commissioner of Taxation, 2000). These include, (1)
round-robin schemes, including non-recourse financing, often in agriculture, afforestation
and franchises; (2) certain film schemes, with guaranteed returns that are, in effect, a
return of part of the invested funds; and (3) employee benefit arrangements that have tax
benefits as their main purpose. It is only the first two types of scheme that are of
relevance to the present study.
An example of a franchise scheme is ‘Oracle’. Oracle offered investors the
opportunity to invest in a business that promoted and presented personal development
and educational workshops. By making an initial cash outlay of $10,000 and borrowing
$30,000 from Oracle’s financing company, investors could claim an immediate tax
deduction of $40,000. This would therefore lead to some investors, depending on their
original income level, to receive a tax refund from the ATO of up to $19,400 (Source:
Oracle International Pty Ltd Prospectus, p3). From here, $10,000 of the $19,400 went
into paying the initial $10,000 set up fee. In some cases, investors were therefore able to
pocket the remaining $9,400. Several aspects of the investment were of concern to the
ATO. One major concern was that the loan of $30,000 was repayable only from the
proceeds of the business. If the business made no profit, investors would not be required
to repay the loan. Therefore, unlike many other investments (e.g., negative gearing of
property), there was no risk to the investor. In addition, some scheme investors made a
profit from their tax return (in some cases the profit was as high as $9,400). Another
concern for the ATO related to the nature of the deduction made. Specifically, only a
fraction of the $40,000 claimed as a tax deduction went into the underlying activity. For
many scheme arrangements, the majority of the money raised went into financing the
management fees.
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Appendix B
Below is a complete list of the measures used in the analyses of the present paper.
It also details the original scale formats, the recoding of the data if applicable, reliability
coefficients of each scale, the mean score and standard deviation obtained on each scale.
Procedural Justice
Measured through five multi-item scales representing procedural justice – three
adapted from Tom Tyler (1997) (scales a-c below) and two adapted from John
Braithwaite and Toni Makkai (1994) (scales d-e below). All responses given on a 1 to 5
scale (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree).
(a) Neutrality. Cronbach’s alpha = 0.60. (M = 2.49, SD = 0.75).
 The Tax Office gives equal consideration to the views of all Australians
  The Tax Office gets the kind of information it needs to make informed
decisions
 The Tax Office is generally honest in the way it deals with people
(b) Tax Office is fair. Cronbach’s alpha = 0.80. (M = 2.15, SD = 0.78).
  The Tax Office considers the concerns of average citizens when making
decisions
 The Tax Office cares about the position of taxpayers
 The Tax Office tries to be fair when making their decisions
(c) Respect. Cronbach’s alpha = 0.71. (M = 3.13, SD = 0.52).
 The Tax Office respects the individual’s rights as a citizen
 The Tax Office is concerned about protecting the average citizen’s rights
(d) Trustworthy treatment from the Tax Office. (M = 2.37, SD = 0.88).
 The Tax Office treats people as if they can be trusted to do the right thing
(e) Consultation. Cronbach’s alpha = 0.68. (M = 2.05, SD = 0.79).
 The Tax Office consults widely about how they might change things to make
it easier for taxpayers to meet their obligations
  The Tax Office goes to great lengths to consult with the community over
changes to their system
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Institutional Trust
A measure of Valerie Braithwaite’s (1997) measure of institutional trust, modified
for use in the taxation context, was constructed by combining responses to all seven
items. This particular scale measured investors’ level of trust in the ATO and it was
found to have a Chronbach’s alpha reliability coefficient of 0.86. (M = 2.40, SD = 0.74).
All responses given on a 1 to 5 scale (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither, 4 =
agree, 5 = strongly agree).
Think of the Tax Office and what it has been doing over the past few years. To
what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements. The Tax
Office…..
 Has misled the Australian people (reverse coded)
 Acted in the interests of all Australians
 Turned its back on its responsibility to Australians (reverse coded)
 Is trusted by you to administer the tax system fairly
 Takes advantage of people who are vulnerable (reverse coded)
 Meets its obligations to Australians
 Is open and honest in its dealings with citizens
Resistance
Measured through a multi-item scale based on the work of Valerie Braithwaite
(1995). All responses given on a 1 to 5 scale (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 =
neither, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree). Cronbach’s alpha = 0.67. (M = 3.72, SD = 0.58).
 It’s impossible to satisfy the requirements of the Tax Office completely
 The Tax Office is more interested in catching you for doing the wrong thing,
than helping you do the right thing
 It’s impossible not to let the Tax Office push you around
 If you don’t cooperate with the Tax Office, they will get tough with you
 Once the Tax Office has you branded as a non-compliant taxpayer, they will
never change their mind
  As a society we need more people willing to take a stand against the Tax
Office
Outcome Favorability
Measured through two items taken from Tom Tyler’s (1997) instrumental
judgement index. All responses given on a 1 to 5 scale (1 = almost never, 2 = on
occasion, 3 = sometimes, 4 = mostly, 5 = almost always). Cronbach’s alpha = 0.70. (M =
2.57, SD = 1.02).
 How often do you agree with the decisions made by the Tax Office?
 How often are the decisions of the Tax Office favorable to you)
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Change in trust
Measured through one item developed by Murphy (2002). (M = 1.43, SD = 0.69).
 As a result of your amended tax return, do you have more or less trust in the
Tax Office? (1 = a lot less trust, 2 = less trust, 3 = no change, 4 = more trust, 5
= a lot more trust).
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Footnotes
1. Under Australia’s self-assessment system of taxation, the ATO initially accepts
taxpayers’ deductions at face value. Part IVA of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936
then empowers the ATO to deny or ‘cancel’ an investor’s tax benefit up to six years after
it has been made if they conclude that the sole or dominant purpose for making the
deduction was to obtain a tax benefit.
2. Several court cases relating to various tax effective schemes have been conducted
over the past few years. The two that have been decided upon (Howland-Rose & Ors vs.
Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2002) FCA 246, (2002) 49 ATR 206, 2002 ATC
4200; Vincent vs. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2002) FCA 656) have agreed with
the ATO’s interpretation of tax law (i.e., scheme related tax deductions do exploit the
spirit of the law and therefore are vehicles for tax avoidance).
3. Favorability in the taxation context can be reasonably assumed to refer to
economic favorability.
4. A total of 2040 taxpayers from the general population were surveyed prior to the
Investors’ Survey by Dr Valerie Braithwaite (2000) from the Centre for Tax System
Integrity, The Australian National University. Between June and December 2000, a
random sample of 7003 Australian citizens was sent a taxation questionnaire. After
repeated appeals for participation, 2040 respondents, or 29% of the sample, returned a
useable survey (for procedural details, see Mearns & Braithwaite, 2001). The sample
proved broadly representative of the Australian population, with the exception that people
younger than 35 tended to be under represented, and people between the age of 40 and 65
years and those more educated were over represented. The general population survey
shared many questions in common with the survey of scheme investors.
5. In order to ensure there were enough degrees of freedom in which to estimate a
non-recursive model, a pathway between two variables first needed to be deleted. The
choice of which path to delete was determined by analysing the bi-variate correlations
between all variables in the model. It was found that the correlation between respect and
resistance was the smallest, so the pathway between these two variables was first deleted
before model estimation began.
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Table 1
Factor analysis differentiating categories of variables
________________________________________________________________________
            Factor                          
            Item                                                                             1          2          3          4          
1. Procedural Justice
ATO concerned about protecting rights 0.65
ATO respects individual’s rights 0.50
ATO considers average citizens concerns 0.63
ATO cares about position of taxpayers 0.63
ATO tries to be fair in decision-making 0.53
ATO gives equal consideration to all 0.48
ATO gets the information it needs to make decisions (0.35)
ATO generally honest in way it deals with people 0.44 0.45
ATO treats people as trustworthy 0.44
ATO thinks people will do right only when forced to 0.48#
The Tax Office more concerned about themselves 0.46#
ATO consults widely about changes 0.58
ATO goes to great lengths to consult 0.53
2. Trust
ATO has misled Australians 0.60
ATO has acted in the interests of all 0.64
ATO has turned its back on its responsibility 0.61
ATO is trusted to administer the tax system fairly 0.44
ATO takes advantage of the vulnerable 0.44
ATO meets its obligations 0.59
ATO is open and honest in its dealings 0.55
3. Resistance
It’s impossible to satisfy ATO -0.46
ATO more interested in catching you -0.50
ATO pushes you around (-0.33)
ATO will get tough if don’t cooperate (-0.39)
ATO never changes mind if non-compliant -0.47
We need to take a stand against ATO -0.44
4. Outcome favorability
Agreement with decisions 0.62
Favorability of decisions                                                                                            0.66     
Eigenvalues (before rotation) 10.50 1.35 1.28 1.20
Explained variance after rotation (%)                                     38        5          5          4          
Note. Principle-components analysis, varimax rotation. Only factor loadings > 0.44 are
displayed.
# denotes an item that loaded onto a different factor than that expected.
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Table 2
Hierarchical regression analysis showing antecedents of taxpayer ‘resistance’ towards the
ATO
Step
Predictor 1 2 3
Age 0.02 0.06** 0.06***
Sex -0.03 -0.01 -0.01
Personal income -0.01 -0.01 -0.03
Family Income -0.02 -0.03 -0.00
Outcome favorability -0.36*** -0.14***
Trust in the ATO -0.53***
R2 0.00 0.13 0.36
Adjusted R2 0.00 0.12 0.36
R2 change 0.00 0.12 0.23
F change 1.11 297.93*** 746.93***
df 4, 2092 1, 2091 1, 2090
Note. predictor entries are standardized regression coefficients (β).
**p<0.01; ***p<0.001.
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Table 3
Hierarchical regression analysis showing antecedents of ‘trust in the ATO’
Step
Predictor 1 2 3
Age 0.05* -0.01 0.01
Sex 0.02 -0.00 0.00
Personal income -0.03 -0.03 0.01
Family Income 0.04 0.05 0.01
Outcome favorability 0.41*** 0.08***
ATO is fair 0.36***
Neutrality 0.30***
Respect 0.04**
ATO consultation 0.10***
Trustworthy treatment from ATO 0.08***
R2 0.00 0.17 0.59
Adjusted R2 0.00 0.17 0.58
R2 change 0.00 0.17 0.42
F change 1.58 414.02*** 410.80***
df 4, 2061 1, 2060 5, 2055
Note. predictor entries are standardized regression coefficients (β).
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.
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Table 4
Chi-square statistics and goodness-of-fit indices for the structural equation model linking
‘resistance’ to level of ‘trust in the ATO’
Goodness of fit statistics Structural
Equation Model
χ2 3.10, p<0.22
df 2
Comparative fit index 1.00
Goodness of fit index 1.00
Adjusted goodness of fit index 0.99
Root mean square 0.02
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Figure 1. Structural equation model demonstrating the relationship between variables of
interest.
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